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Abstract
We use data from the US airline industry to estimate a model of entry de-
terrence. We model the interaction among airlines as a repeated static game,
where we allow for a very general form of heterogeneity. We consider a menu of
three alternative games that describe the strategic interaction among airlines:
simultaneous and sequential move games, and a sequential move game with
deterrence investments. Following Bernheim [1984], deterrence investments in-
clude all investment that raises barriers to entry, and for which the incumbent
must incur some investment costs. We show that the prots that incumbents
can make in the sequential game, both with and without deterrence investments,
are larger than those that they can make if the game is played simultaneously.
Thus, we nd that on average it is protable for all rms to deter new entrants,
with the exception of United Airlines. Remarkably, United Airlines was under
bankruptcy protection during the period of analysis, suggesting that its deter-
rence investments were not credible. Overall, we nd that the data is explained
better by a model where rms make deterrence investments. Thus, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that incumbents deter entrants in the airline industry.
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1 Introduction
In 1999 the Transportation Research Board (TRB [1999]) prepared a list of informal
complaints of anticompetitive behavior submitted by airlines to the Department of
Transportation. The list of complaints was striking for several important reasons.
First, all of the complaints were made by low cost carriers against legacy carriers.
Second, the complaints concerned competition in markets connecting the hub of the
legacy airline and medium-sized cities, such as Mobile, Des Moines, or Jacksonville.
Finally, and most importantly for this paper, all complaints centered on the claim
that legacy carriers had used exclusionary tactics to maintain their monopoly in the
markets cited in the complaint. In essence, this list of complaints provides stylized
and anecdotal evidence that legacy carriers act to deter the entrance or force the
exit of low cost carriers in order to maintain a monopoly in certain markets. In this
paper, we propose a practical and transparent methodology to determine whether
rms make investments to raise barriers to deter new entrants. Determining whether
rms successfully deter new entrants is an important topic of research because, where
entry is not articially impeded, competition ensures that prices are in the long run
reective of the full cost of e¢ ciently providing airline services.
We start from the observation that in any theory of entry deterrence, the incum-
bent can prevent the entry of competitors but only at a cost or investment that the
incumbent could avoid if entry were instead accommodated. We call these costs the
deterrence investments(Bernheim [1984]). Then, we exploit the theory developed
in Bernheim [1984], where the denition of deterrence investment is intentionally am-
biguous so as to abstract from the complex issues that arise with particular theories
of entry deterrence and to focus on the fundamental trade-o¤ that the incumbent
faces. Firms can make deterrence investments to block the entry of prot-lowering
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competitors, and deterrence investments include all investment that raise barriers to
entry, but these investments are costly. Our objective is to estimate the costs of
deterrence investments and compare them with the prots made by the rm when
they do not deter their competitors; we then predict whether or not rms make these
investments when they face the threat of new entry.
We model the interaction among airlines as a repeated static entry game, where
we allow for very general forms of heterogeneity, which lead to multiple equilibria. In
the same spirit as Kadiyali [1996], we estimate a menu of di¤erent games to choose
the one that ts the data best. The rst game is a repeated static simultaneous
move entry game with complete information. This is akin to the game studied by
Ciliberto and Tamer [2009], except that airlines interact repeatedly over time. The
second game is a repeated static game, where rms can face two scenarios, depending
on the exogenous history of the game. If one of the rms was the only incumbent in
the prior period, then the rms play a sequential move game where the incumbent
moves rst. Otherwise, the rms play a one-shot simultaneous move game as in
Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] and move to the next period. Finally, we consider a game
where the rms can make deterrence investments in a sequential move game. Thus,
the model that allows only for simultaneous move games is nested into the one that
allows for sequential move games depending on the game history, which is nested into
the one that allows for rms playing a sequential move game to also make deterrence
investments.
To identify deterrence investments, we use changes in rmsentry decisions over
time. The idea is to compare entry decisions across similar markets whose market
structures change di¤erently over time. In particular, if there are two markets that
have identical observable and unobservable characteristics, and in one there is only
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one incumbent over time, while in the other there are periods with two rms, then
it must be the case that the incumbent in the rst market does deter new entrants.
Using this simple idea, we estimate the costs that incumbents must face to make
"deterrence investments" and determine if there are some airlines that systematically
prevent new entry.
Data are from the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), which is a 10 percent
sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers. These are quarterly data from 2004,
and they are organized by market, year, and quarter. The panel data provide the
variation needed to identify both the competitive e¤ect of the rmsentry () and the
cost of the deterrence investments (c). First, we observe entry in markets where there
are no incumbents (or there is more than one incumbent), and there we will assume
that rms play a simultaneous move game. We also observe entry in markets where
there is only one incumbent, and there we will assume that rms play a sequential-
move game. Therefore, we identify c separately from . Second, the set of competitors
vary by market, so it is possible to allow rms to have heterogeneous competitive
e¤ects and deterrence costs.
The estimation is largely based on Tamer [2003] and Ciliberto and Tamer [2009],
who propose a methodology to estimate a game among airlines in a one-shot static
simultaneous-move game. The fundamental idea behind their methodology, which we
will briey review in the paper, is that even in the presence of multiple equilibria,
one can estimate sets of parameters of the prot functions that correspond to models
with di¤erent equilibrium selection rules. Tamer [2003] and Ciliberto and Tamer
[2009] show that one can construct upper and lower bounds for the probabilities
that the various equilibrium outcomes can take and then choose the parameters that
minimize an appropriately dened distance between these lower and upper bounds
4
and the empirical probabilities. Methodologically, the di¤erence here is that when
rms can play a sequential move or deterrence game, there will be almost always a
unique equilibrium. However, because in some markets rms play a simultaneous
move game, we still will only be able to estimate sets of parameter values, and so we
will not be able to achieve point identication.
We nd that the model where rms make deterrence investments ts the data
much better than a model where rms play a simultaneous or sequential move game.
Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that incumbents deter entrants in the airline
industry. In addition, we show that the prots incumbents can make if they move rst
are larger than those that they can make if the game is played simultaneously. This
result is stronger, as one would expect, when incumbents can deter new entrants. Fi-
nally, we nd that all rms deter new entrants, with the exception of United Airlines.
Remarkably, United Airlines was under bankruptcy protection during the period of
analysis, suggesting that its deterrence investments were not credible. This last result
underscores the importance of modeling rms as heterogenous competitors.
Our paper contributes to two important literatures. First we contribute to the
literature on the estimation of entry games with complete information (Bresnahan
and Reiss [1990], Berry [1992], Mazzeo [2002], and Ciliberto and Tamer [2009]) by
allowing rms to play a simultanous or sequential-move game and to deter new en-
trants. Bresnahan and Reiss [1990] and Berry [1992] considered a sequential and a
simultaneous-move game as alternatives to describe the interaction between car deal-
ers and airlines. However, Bresnahan and Reiss [1990] and Berry [1992] maintained
that rms were playing the same game, whether simultaneous or sequential-move,
in all markets. Here, the selection of the type of game played is a function of the
past history of the game, and thus rms play sequential and simultaneous move game
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across di¤erent markets and time.
Second, we contribute to the literature on deterrence. Our paper is closest to
Kadiyali [1996], which examines deterrence and entry in the photographic lm in-
dustry. Kadiyali [1996] estimates the post-entry demand and cost functions of two
rms by estimating a menu of di¤erent games and choosing the game that ts the
data best. With these demand and cost estimates, she concludes that the incumbent
was forced to accommodate the entrant because the prot the incumbent would have
made under a deterrence strategy was lower than the prot it made under accommo-
dation. Kadiyalis strategy relies on identifying one particular postentry game that
is being played in all markets. In our paper, we allow for rms to play multiple types
of games across markets and time. We also allow for rm heterogeneity, which leads
to multiple equilibria in the number and identity of rms; this allows for a more
general framework for examining deterrence. Other papers in the deterrence liter-
ature include Ellison and Ellison [2011] and Goolsbee and Syverson [2008]. Ellison
and Ellison [2011] test a theoretical prediction of the relationship between investment
and market size - a relationship that di¤ers depending on whether or not rms deter
potential entrants. Goolsbee and Syversion [2008] identify deterrence by looking at
changes in incumbent behavior that result from exogenous changes in potential entry
behavior. Di¤erently from these two papers, our paper explicitly allows for multiple
equilibria and for rms to decide between deterrence and accommodation. There are
also dynamic structural models of deterrence, including Sweeting [2013], Williams
[2011], Chicu [2012], and Snider [2009]. These dynamic models allow forward-looking
behavior by rms; however, none of these papers allow for multiple equilibria.
The theoretical literature on deterrence is vast. Both Spence [1977] and Dixit
[1980] provide theoretical arguments for deterrence. Spence [1977] shows that entry
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can be deterred by the mere existence of capacity; Dixit [1980] extends the argument
and shows that since investment in capacity can alter the outcomes in the post-
entry game, there can be incentives to invest in capacity in order to deter potential
entrants. There are many variations on this basic theoretical model. Fudenberg
and Tirole [1984] add advertising and show that an incumbents low advertising pre-
entry is a credible threat of deterrence, because it allows the incumbent rm to cut
prices if a competitor were to enter. Judd [1985] allows for multiproduct incumbent
rms, and he allows these rms to exit after entrants enter the market; he shows
that intensive post-entry competition may facilitate entry, because the multiproduct
incumbent rms are more likely to exit the market. Bulow et al. [1985] show that the
incentives for a rm to engage in deterrence di¤er depending on whether potential
competitorsgoods are substitutes or complements. In particular, when goods are
strategic complements, rms may underinvest in capital in order to reduce future
competition. Bernheim [1984] extends the basic model to allow rms to enter over
multiple periods. In this case, he shows the counterintuitive result that policies
that are intended to increase competition, such as subsidizing entry, can have the
opposite e¤ect. Finally, Anderson and Engers (1994) do not focus on deterrence, but
they develop a theoretical model that solves the problem in the standard Stackelberg
model that the order of moves is exogenously specied. In their model rms compete
over entry time. In our analysis, the order of moves is exogenous, but it changes
across markets and time.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes anecdotal evidence of deter-
rence in the airline industry. Section 3 describes the model and econometric method-
ology. Section 4 provides information on the data, and Section 5 details the ident-
ication strategy. Section 6 presents the estimation results, and Section 7 compares
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counterfactual prots under each type of game. Section 8 concludes.
2 Anedoctal Evidence of Strategic Deterrence
In 1999, the Transportation Research Board, a unit of the National Research Council,
prepared a report on entry and competition in the US Airline Industry. As part of
this extensive and informative report, the Transportation Research Board provided a
list of informal complaints received by the Department of Transportation from new
entrant airlines about unfair exclusionary practices between March 1993 and May
1999.
Table 1 summarizes the list of informal complaints received by the Department
of Transportation by the Complaining Party, always a Low Cost Carrier; by the party
against whom the complaint was led, always a national carrier; the quarter when
the complaint was led; and the markets which were involved in the complaint.
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Table 1: Informal Complaints Received by the Department of Transportation
Complaining Complained Period Markets Involved in the Complaint
Party Against
AccessAir Northwest (NW) 3/1999 Markets between New York, Los Angeles and
Des Moines and Moline/Quad Cities/Peoria
AccessAir Delta, NW, TWA 5/1999 Markets between New York, Los Angeles and
Des Moines and Moline/Quad Cities/Peoria
AirTran Delta 8/1998 General
Kiwi Continental 2/1998 Niagara-Newark
Valuejet Northwest 3/1997 Atlanta-Memphis
Valuejet Delta 2/1997 General (e.g. Atlanta-Mobile)
Frontier United 1/1997 General (e.g. Denver-Los Angeles)
Spirit Northwest 11/1996 Detroit-Philadelphia, Detroit-Boston
Vanguard American 10/1996 DFW and Kansas City, Phoenix,
Cincinnati, Wichita
Air South Continental 3/1996 Newark and Charleston, Columbia, Myrtle Beach
Vanguard Northwest 8/1995 Minneapolist and Chicago Midway, Kansas City
Valuejet USAir 3/1995 Washington Dulles and Florida, Hartford, Boston.
Valuejet Delta 12/1993 Markets out of Atlanta, in particular
to Jacksonville, Memphis
Reno Air Northwest 3/1993 Reno-Minneapolis
From the Special Report 255: Entry and Competition in the US Airline Industry
Issues and Opportunities,Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, July 1999.
Table 1 provides three fundamental insights on the nature of competition between
low cost carriers and national carriers.
First, some national airlines show much more aggressive behavior against new en-
trants than others. In particular, Delta, Northwest, American, and Continental have
used aggressive competitive behavior in several markets and over time. One telling
case involved Northwests behavior toward Reno Air. In 1993, Reno Air announced
that it would enter the Reno-Minneapolis/St Paul market, which, at that time, was
not served on a nonstop basis by Northwest. After Renos entry, Northwest announced
that it would not only start nonstop service between Reno and Minneapolis/St Paul,
but it would also enter three of Reno Airs existing nonstop markets: Reno-Seattle,
Reno-Los Angeles, and Reno-San Diego. Northwest would also match Reno Airs
fares in all markets.
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Second, the markets where national carriers have reacted aggressively against low
cost carriers were always markets out of the hub of the national carrier. In light of
Spence [1977] and Dixit [1980], this is not surprising, since national carriers make
large sunk investment costs at their hubs. Spence and Dixit show that incumbents
might strategically invest in capacity to deter new entrants, and this is exactly what
national carriers might be doing at their hubs. Airlines make sunk investment costs
in their hubs through the signing of long-term leases for the use of gates and check-in
positions, and participation in the costs of airportsexpansions and modernizations.
Finally, the markets that are mentioned in Table 1 are mainly markets between
a hub and a medium-sized MSA, such as Mobile, Des Moines, or Jacksonville. The
markets where national carriers show aggressive behavior toward low cost airlines are
not markets between the largest MSAs in the United States.
3 The Entry Game Played by the Airlines: Esti-
mation
We assume here that the game played by the airlines is played repeatedly over time.
In each period, airlines know each other strategies and payo¤s; thus, this is a com-
plete information game. A strategy prole in this game tells each rm under what
conditions to enter into a market, and it will depend on the nature of the game that
the rms play (i.e. whether the game is simultaneous- or sequential-move).
Formally, there are I airlines, indexed by i = 1; :::; I, that must decide whether to
enter into the market m = 1; :::;M at time t = 1; :::;1. Let yimt = 1 if rm i enters
in market m at time t and yimt = 0 otherwise. The entry decisions ymt are observed
but the prots made by the rms, mt, are unobservable.
The data consist of a random sample of market-rm-time specic observations
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(ymt;Xmt). Let mt = (1mt; : : : ; Im t) be a mean zero random variable, independent,
both across time and across markets, of Xmt, and it has a known (up to a nite di-
mensional parameter 
) distribution F
. mt = (imt; :::; Im t) is known to the players
but unobserved to the econometrician, which is why we have a game of complete
information.
The unobservable error imt is modeled as follows:.
imt = m + mt + im +  imt:
m represents market unobservables that are market specic and constant over
time; it captures, for example, the fact that in market m there is a large share of
business passengers. mt is a market shock that changes over time, and which a¤ects
rms in market m in the same way; for example, changes in the demand for travel
over time. im is a time-invariant market-specic airline shock to allow di¤erent rms
to face di¤erent unobservables in the same market; for example, some airlines might
see a larger share of business passengers in the same market than other airlines do.
Finally,  imt are time-variant, rm-specic shocks.
Xmt is a kI matrix of k exogenous determinants of entry decisions, both market-
and carrier-specic. It includes both a vector of market characteristics that are
common among the rms in market m and a vector of rm characteristics that enter
into the prots of all the rms in that market.
3.1 Simultaneous Move Game
The instantaneous prot function is written as follows:
imt = X
0
imt +
X
j 6=i
jyjmt + imt:
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The observed part of the prot is known up to a nite dimensional parameter
vector   (; ).
An important feature of the prot function in this paper is the presence of j,
which summarizes the e¤ect that airline j has on is prots. In particular, notice
that this function depends directly on the identity of the rms (yjs, j 6= i). If we
assume that rms play a simultaneous-move game in all markets and in all periods,
then this is simply the model in Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] applied to panel data
rather than to cross section data. We refer to that paper for the detailed description
of the estimation methodology. Here we provide a brief summary.
The statistical model associated with the simultaneous move game is as follows:
8>><>>:
1mt = X
0
1mt +
P
j 6=1 jyjmt + 1mt;
2mt = X
0
2mt +
P
j 6=2 jyjmt + 2mt;
::::
Imt = X
0
Imt +
P
j 6=I jyjmt + Im t;
(1)
with j = 1; :::; I: Thus, this is simultanous system of discrete choice equations.
The problem with the estimation of such model is that in general it has multiple
equilibria. Tamer [2003] proposed a methodology to identify sets of parameters of
the model for the case of two rms choosing between two decisions (e.g. whether
or not to enter into a market) and Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] provided a practical
methodology to estimate sets in the case of many rms making multiple decisions.
In particular, Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] show that Model (1) provides the following
inequality restrictions on regressions:
H1(x; )  Pr(yjx)  H2(x; ); (2)
where Pr(yjx) is a 2I vector of choice probabilities that we consistently estimate
using the data, and we interpret the inequalities element by element. The Hs are
functions of  and the distribution function F
, where 
 is part of the vector . As
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Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] explain, the identied set, I , is then the set of parameter
values that obeys the inequality restrictions for all x almost everywhere and represents
the set of economic models that is consistent with the empirical evidence. For a given
parameter value, the estimator is based on minimizing the distance between this
vector of choice probabilities and the set of predicted probabilities.
We estimate Model (1) using a sharp two-step minimum distance estimator. First,
we estimate the conditional choice probabilities non-parametrically, using a simple
frequency estimator. Then, we estimate the identied set I using the simulation
procedure provided in Ciliberto and Tamer [2009]. In practice we simulate random
draws of m, mt, im, and  imt from four independent normal distributions with mean
zero and variance equal to 1.
3.2 Sequential Move Game
We now consider the case when rms might play di¤erent games depending on the
exogenous history of their previous interactions. More specically, we will maintain
that at each time t and in each market m, airlines can play one of two types of games:
a simultaneous-move game or a sequential-move game. The game that rms play
at time t + 1 is determined by the observed market structure at time t. If in the
data we observe that at time t in market m rm 2 was the only incumbent, then
at time t + 1 the two rms play a sequential move game, where rm 2 is the leader
and rm 1 is the follower. (If there were no incumbents or multiple incumbents in
the previous period, then the rms play a simultaneous-move game). In a sequential-
move game, one rm makes her entry decision before the other rms choose theirs,
and all other rms can observe the rst movers choice. Thus, in a sequential-move
game the followersactions are conditional on the rst movers actions. If the rms
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play a sequential-move game, then they use the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
solution concept to solve the game they play. A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is
a combination of rms strategies ymt such that no rm can unilaterally benet from
choosing a di¤erent strategy at any stage of the game.
To illustrate the type of game that rms play at each period, consider Table 2,
which presents several possible scenarios with two airlines (American and Delta) in
one particular market. In the rst quarter of 1998 neither of the two airlines was
serving this particular market. Therefore, in the second quarter of 1998, there was no
incumbent, and thus the two airlines played a simultaneous-move game. Among the
possible realizations, the airlines ended up in the one where American entered into
the market, while Delta did not enter. In the third quarter of 1998, American is now
the incumbent and moves rst, and Delta follows. The interpretation of the game in
the other quarters is analogous.
Table 2: The Game Played by Airlines in One Particular Market
Time (quarter/year)
Airline 1/1998 2/1998 3/1998 4/1998 1/1999 2/1999
AA 0 1 1 1 0 0
DL 0 0 1 1 1 1
Type of ... Simult. Sequential Simult. Simult. Sequential
Game AA Moves DL Moves
First First
Note: Observable and unobservable market conditions change over time.
Consider now the game played in the third quarter of 1998 by the two rms.
American was the incumbent in the second quarter, and thus American must decide
whether or not to enter before Delta makes its decision. To determine the one-shot
equilibrium of the game, the game is solved through backward induction. First, we
determine the Nash pure strategy equilibria in the second stage of the game, the
one where only Delta must decide whether to enter, given the decision made by
American. Then, we determine whether in the second stage equilibrium chosenby
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Delta, American makes nonnegative prots. If there is such an equilibrium (or more)
in the second stage, American can pick it by moving rst.
Consider, for example, the situation where there are two equilibria in the simultaneous-
move game, which is the game that the two rms would be playing if American did
not have a rst-mover advantage. Let the categorical variable yAA = 1 if American
is in the market, otherwise yAA = 0. Similarly, yDL = 1 if Delta is in the mar-
ket. Let the rst equilibrium be (yAA; yDL) = (0; 1): American does not enter, while
Delta enters into the market. Let the second equilibrium of the last stage game be
(yAA; yDL) = (1; 0): American enters, Delta does not enter. In the sequential game
where American moves rst, there will be a unique equilibrium, (yAA; yDL) = (1; 0).
The sequential and simultaneous move games have the same payo¤s but they
possibly have di¤erent equilibria. The set of equilibria of the sequential move game
is a subset of the one in the simultaneous move game. This observation leads to the
discussion concerning the estimation.
If the rms play a sequential move game in a market at some point in time, and
there is a unique equilibrium, then the inequalities (2) hold with equality. The way
we derive the equalities and inequalities is conceptually analogous to the way that
Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] derive the inequalities for the simultaneous move game.
First, we estimate non-parametrically the empirical probability of each market
structure as in the rst step for the estimation of the parameters in the simultaneous
move game, except that now we need to include the information on whether or not
there is an incumbent, and its identity.
Then, we determine the game that the rms play, whether simultaneous- or se-
quential move. In particular, we determine for each market m in each period t the
equilibria of the simultaneous-move game. Then, we determine whether there is at
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least one equilibrium where the incumbent (e.g. American) is in the market among
these simultaneous-move equilibria. As in the example above, if there is such an equi-
librium, then the incumbent will move rst and will able to select this equilibrium.
Clearly this process is only applied if there is an incumbent in the market; otherwise,
we solve the game as if it were a simultaneous move game.
3.3 A Game of Strategic Deterrence
Generally, the fact that one airline, say American, has the rst mover advantage
does not imply that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium where American is
in the market. This only occurs if there is one subgame perfect equilibrium where
American is in the market. This is where the role of strategic deterrence comes into
play. Following Bernheim [1984], we will assume that an incumbent can opt to deter
new entrants when the game is sequential. An incumbent rm i can make deterrence
investments by paying a deterrence cost ci at time t and ensure that it will be a
monopolist at time t+ 1.
To understand the role of the deterrence investments, consider again the example
of the strategic interaction between American and Delta illustrated inTable 2. In the
third quarter of 1998, American must decide rst whether to deter new entrants. If
American pays a deterrence cost cAA, then American can deter new entrants and make
the expected value of the stream of future prots when the rm is a monopolist today,
MAA. Americans value to entry would then be given by 
M
AA  cAA. If American does
not pay the deterrence cost, then the airlines play the sequential game just described.
American will deter new entrants if: i) the cost of deterrence is lower than the
monopoly value to entry; ii) the prot that American makes under deterrence, MAA 
cAA, is not smaller than the lowest value to entry that American would make in any
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of the subgame perfect equilibria of the sequential game played by airlines should
American not deter new entrants. Thus, American might not deter new entrants
even when it could do so.
In the sequential-move game where rms can make deterrence investments we
proceed as follows. As in the sequential-move game, we rst estimate the empirical
probability of each market structure conditional on whether one of the rms was a
single incumbent in the previous period. So the rst stage nonparametric estimates
are the same in the case when we allow rms to play a sequential move game and
when we allow them to make deterrence investments.
Then, we solve the game as if the rms were playing a sequential-move game; that
is, as if they did not have the possibility to make deterrence investments. We then
compute the prots of the incumbent in each of the subgame perfect equilibria of
the sequential game. Among all these prots we choose the one where the incumbent
makes the lowest prot. Next, we compute the deterrence prot, given by the prot
that the incumbent would make as a monopolist, and we subtract the deterrence cost
c. We compare the deterrence protof the incumbent to the lowest prot that the
incumbent would make in the equilibria of the sequential game. If the deterrence
protis lower, then the incumbent plays a sequential game; if the prots minus the
deterrence costs are non-negative, the incumbent incurs the deterrence cost and deter
new entrants; otherwise the rms play a simultaneous-move game.
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4 Data and Variables1
4.1 Data
The main data are from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) from the
year 2004; this data include details on each domestic itinerary, including operating
carrier, origin carrier, origin and destination airports, number of passengers, distance,
and the fare. We merge this dataset by operating carrier with the T-100 Domestic
Segment Dataset, which contains domestic market data by air carriers, origin and
destination airports for passengers enplaned. Unlike the DB1B dataset, the T-100 is
not a sample; it reports all domestic ights in a given month of the year. From the
merged dataset we drop tickets with ights that have a frequency that is less than
weekly, and we also drop tickets with ights for which there is no record in the T-100
Segment. We then clean the dataset as described in Ciliberto and Tamer [2009].2 The
unit of observation in the cleaned dataset is by market-carrier-year-quarter. Since we
are only interested in knowing whether or not a carrier served a market, we construct
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the carrier serves the market and 0 otherwise.
Therefore, the unit of observation is by market-year-quarter in the nal dataset. Time
is denoted by t, and a unit of observation is individually denoted by the triple jmt.
We dene a market as a trip between two airports, regardless of intermediate
transfer points and direction of ight. Table 1, which lists informal complaints about
1Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] use the same dataset but on a di¤erent set of markets and as a
cross-section.
2In particular, we drop: 1) Tickets with more than 6 coupons; 2) Tickets involving US-
nonreporting carrier ying within North America (small airlines serving big airlines) and foreign
carrier ying between two US points; 3) Tickets that are part of international travel; 4) Tickets
involving non-contiguous domestic travel (Hawaii, Alaska, and Territories); 5) Tickets whose fare
credibility is questioned by the DOT; 6) Tickets that are neither one-way nor round-trip travel; 7)
Tickets including travel on more than one airline on a directional trip (known as interline tickets);
8) Tickets with fares less than 20 dollars; 9) Tickets in the top and bottom ve percentiles of the
year-quarter fare distribution. We dene a rm as serving a market if it transported at least 20
passengers in one quarter.
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unfair exclusionary practices, provides insights on the nature of competition between
low cost carriers and national carriers, and we use these insights to determine the
relevant markets. We merge our data with demographic information from the U.S.
Census Bureau for all Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) of the United States.
We then rank airports by the MSAs market size. To maintain exogeneity of selection
of markets to the observed patterns of entry, we include all markets out of the top
150 MSAs as ranked by their population.3 We then drop all markets where the two
endpoints are both in the top 30 MSAs.4
We also include markets that are temporarily not served by any carrier, where the
number of observed entrants is equal to zero. To distinguish markets that are almost
never served by any carrier from markets that are only temporarily not served by any
carrier, we proceed as in Ciliberto and Tamer [2009]. Using the full 1996-2007 dataset
of market-carrier-year-quarter observations, we compute the number of quarters that
a market has been served by at least one carrier, for each market, m.5 Then, we
drop all markets that were not served in at least 50 percent of the quarters in the full
dataset.
We consider all the national carriers (American, Continental, Delta, Northwest,
United, USAir, Southwest). Small, low-cost carriers are present in only a few mar-
kets.6 Rather than dropping these carriers from the market analysis because we
cannot identify their impact on the entry decisions of competitors, we group them in
3Following Borenstein (1989), we assume that ights to di¤erent airports in the same metropolitan
area are in separate markets.
4The list of the MSAs is available from the authors.
5We exclude the Muskegon County Airport, the Saint Petersburg-Clearwater International Air-
port, and the Atlantic City International Airport because there are too few markets between these
airports and the remaining airports.
6One important issue is how to treat regional airlines that operate through code-sharing with
national airlines. As long as the regional airline is independently owned and issues tickets, we treat
it separately from the national airline.
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a meaningful way in order to capture the impact of their presence. To this end, we
construct an indicator variable, Low Cost Carrier Small, LCC, which is equal to 1
if one or more low cost carriers are present in the market, and 0 otherwise. Carriers
are denoted by i. We exclude all markets in which one of the carriers has a hub at
either endpoint.
As in Ciliberto and Tamer [2009], the entry decision in each market for each airline
is interpreted as a marginaldecision, and the airlines network structure is taken
as given. This marginal approach to the study of airline markets is also used in the
literature that studies the relationship between market concentration and pricing. For
example, Borenstein [1989] does not include prices in other markets out of Atlanta
(e.g. ATL-ORD) to explain fares in the market ATL-AUS.
4.2 Variables
Using Berrys [1992] insight, we use the carriers Airport Presence at the markets
endpoints to construct measures of carrier heterogeneity. To compute airport presence
at one airport, we compute a carriers ratio of markets served by the carrier out of
an airport over the total number of markets served out of an airport by at least one
carrier. We then average the carriers airport presence at the two endpoints to dene
the carriers Airport Presence.7
A rm- and market-specic measure of cost is not available. To proxy for the cost
that a carrier incurs in order to serve a particular market, we construct a measure of
the opportunity xed cost of serving a market. To do this, we rst compute the sum
of the geographical distances between a markets endpoints and the carriers closest
7In the case of the Medium Airlines (MA), we rst compute the airport presence for USAir,
Continental, and America West, and then we take the maximum of the three. In the case of the
Low Cost Carriers (LCC), we rst compute the airport presence of each of the low cost carriers,
and then again we take their maximum.
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hub.8 Then, we compute the di¤erence between this distance and the nonstop distance
between the two airports, and we divide this di¤erence by the nonstop distance. This
ratio can be interpreted as the percentage of the nonstop distance that must be
traveled if the airline were to use a connecting ight instead of a nonstop ight to
serve the market. This is a good measure of the opportunity xed cost of serving a
market, because it measures the cost of the best alternative to non-stop service, which
is a connecting ight through the closest hub. This measure is associated with the
xed cost of providing airline service because it is a function of the total capacity of
a plane but does not depend on the number of passengers transported in a particular
ight. We denote this variable as Cost.
We include six control variables. Three are demographic variables.9 We calculate
Market Size as the geometric mean of the city populations at the market endpoints in
order to measure the size of the potential market. We use average per capita incomes
(Per Capita Income) and the average rates of income growth (Income Growth Rate)
of the cities at the market endpoints to measure the strength of the economies at
the endpoints. The other three control variables are geographical variables. Market
Distance is the non-stop distance between the endpoints. The distance from each
airport to the closest alternative airport (Close Airport) controls for the strength of
8Data on the distances between airports, which are also used to construct the variable Close
Airport are from the dataset Aviation Support Tables : Master Coordinate, available from the
National Transportation Library. To construct the measure of Cost we consider the following hub
airports: Dallas Fort Worth and Chicago OHare for American; Cleveland, Houston International,
and Newark for Continental; Atlanta, Cincinnati and Dallas Fort Worth for Delta; Phoenix and Las
Vegas for America West; Minneapolis and Detroit for Northwest; Denver and Chicago OHare for
United; Charlotte, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia for USAir. To derive the measure of Cost for the
Medium Airlines (MA) we take the minimum among the distances that we compute for Continental,
USAir, America West, and Northwest. Southwest does not really have major hubs; it uses several
airports, among which we consider Chicago Midway, Baltimore, Las Vegas, Houston Hobby, Phoenix,
Orlando. With the exception of ATA, Low Cost Carriers do not have hubs in the same sense that
we mean for the largest carriers. To construct a measure of the cost, we computed the (minimum)
distance from airports where LCCs had a meaningful presence.
9Data are from the Regional Economic Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, download
in February, 2005.
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passengersalternative option, which is to y from a di¤erent airport to the same
destination.10 Finally, we also include the sum of the distances from the market
endpoints to the geographical center of the United States (US Center Distance).
This variable controls for the fact that, just for purely geographical reasons, cities
in the middle of the United States have a larger set of close cities than cities on the
coasts or cities at the borders with Mexico and Canada.11
10For example, Chicago Midway is the closest alternative airport to Chicago OHare. Notice that
for each market we have two of these distances, since we have two endpoints. Our variable is equal
to the minimum of these two distances. In previous versions of the paper we addressed the concern
that many large cities have more than one airport. For example, it is possible to y from San
Francisco to Washington on nine di¤erent routes. In a previous version of the paper,we allowed
the rmsunobservables to be spatially correlated across markets between the same two cities. In
the estimation, whenever a market was included in the subsample that we drew to construct the
parameter bounds, we also included any other market between the same two cities. This is similar
to adjusting the moment conditions to allow for spatial correlation. In our context, it was easy to
adjust for it since we knew which of the observations were correlated, i.e., ones that had airports in
close proximity.
11The location of the mean center of population is from the Geography Division at the U.S. Bureau
of the Census. Based on the 1990 census results, that was located in Crawford County, Missouri.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics, by Airline
AA CO DL LCC MA NW UA
Variables
Airline 0.298 (0.457) 0.259 (0.438) 0.466 (0.499) 0.141 (0.348) 0.230 (0.421) 0.255 (0.436) 0.227 (0.419)
Airline Incumbent 0.044 (0.205) 0.072 (0.258) 0.173 (0.378) 0.002 (0.046) 0.010 (0.098) 0.065 (0.247) 0.022 (0.145)
Airline Entry 0.034 (0.182) 0.020 (0.140) 0.046 (0.209) 0.014 (0.120) 0.038 (0.190) 0.036 (0.188) 0.035 (0.184)
Airport Presence 0.344 (0.157) 0.227 (0.187) 0.530 (0.207) 0.127 (0.083) 0.219 (0.123) 0.283 (0.180) 0.275 (0.138)
Cost 0.576 (1.154) 0.536 (1.017) 0.645 (1.297) 0.510 (1.220) 0.266 (0.475) 0.868 (1.606) 0.803 (1.469)
Market Distance 0.815 (0.477)
US Center Distance 1.220 (0.427)
Closest Airport 0.347 (0.212)
Market Size (population) 1.998 (0.995)
Change Income Market 4.089 (0.313)
Number Airports 1.611 (0.550)
Number of Markets 844
Number of Quarters 4
Number of Observations 3376
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Table 3 presents summary statistics for the exogenous variables that determine
entry12. All the variables are means within a market.
In order to run the estimation and compute the condence intervals using Cher-
nozhukov, Hong, and Tamer [2007], we discretize the continuous variables. Variables
could be discretized in quartiles or deciles; here, we discretize the variables using
extremely ne discretizations so that the discrete variables have the same means and
standard deviations as the continuous variables.
5 Identication
5.1 Identication of Strategic Deterrence
There are at least three reasons why one rm might be a monopolist for a long period
of time in a market that are completely unrelated to strategic deterrence.
First, a rm might have a particularly high market-carrier shock, allowing it to
operate as a monopolist over a long period of time. To address this possibility, we use
the basic idea that one bad shock to a rm cannot explain why a rm never enters in
a market where American is the incumbent. If the other rm is protable on average,
then that rm should enter unless American deters its entry. To identify deterrence
from a high market-carrier shock, we include im.
Second, there might only be space for one rm in the market, in the sense that
two rms would not be able to both make nonnegative prots. However, if this is
the case, then we should see no pattern in the identity of the monopolist over time.
Third, there might be multiple equilibria with di¤erent number of rms in a market,
and we might simply observe the equilibrium with one rm rather than one with two
12Several variables, such as prices or market shares are excluded because they are endogenous.
For example, markets with a larger number of rms are more likely to see lower prices. We only
include variables that are predetermined or clearly exogeneous to the entry decision.
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or more rms. The rst two columns of Table 4 illustrate how we plan to identify
strategic deterrence from these other two possibilities.
There are two rms that compete against each other in one market, and for
simplicity of exposition, we again consider American and Delta as the two competing
rms. At time 0 neither rm is present in the market, because neither rm makes
nonnegative prots. Then at time 1 there is a positive shock to the prots of both
rms and either one but not both of the rms can enter into the market. American
enters. At time 2 there is another positive shock to the prots of both rms, and now
both American and Delta can protably enter into the market. However, we observe
only American in the market. At time 3 there is a negative shock to the prots of
both rms and American must exit the market. At time 4 there is a positive shock to
both prots and either one but not both of the rms can enter into the market. This
time Delta enters. At time 5 there is another positive shock to both prots and both
American and Delta enter into the market.
The rst two columns of Table 4 summarize this example. American was able to
prevent the entry of Delta when American was the incumbent, while Delta was not
able to prevent the entry of American when Delta was the incumbent.
Table 4: Occurrence of Strategic Deterrence
Time Possible Firms Number of Firms Prots of the Firms
in Equilibrium Observed in the Data
0 0 0 (0; 0)
1 AA or DL AA
 
MAA; 0

2 AA and DL AA
 
MAA   cAA; 0

3 0 0 (0; 0)
4 AA or DL DL
 
0; MDL   AA

5 AA and DL AA and DL
 
MAA   DL; MDL   AA

... ... ... ...
Possible Firms in Equilibrium indicates the identity of the rms that could
be making nonnegative prot in equilibrium. Actual Firms in Equilibrium
indicates the identity of rms that are observed in the data.
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Table 4 implies that American must face lower deterrence costs than Delta and
that American did deter Delta from entry at time t = 2. The last column of Table 4
shows how the identication strategy discussed in the rst two columns of Table 4
can be used to identify the cost that airlines must incur to deter new entrants. Since
American deterred Delta from entry at time t = 2, then it must be that MAA  cAA >
MAA   DL, that is the value to entry of American in this market when it deters
Delta is higher than the value to entry of American as a duopolist. On the contrary,
MDL   cDL > MDL   AA, Deltas value to entry as a monopolist in this market is not
large enough to justify the deterrence costs. The variation across and within markets
identies MAA, 
D
AA, 
M
DL, 
D
DL, cAA, and cDL.
The critical feature of this stylized model is that the incumbent faces a trade-o¤.
The incumbent can deter new entrants, but only at a cost ci. Whether the incumbent
will actually deter new entrants depends on the characteristics (and unobservables)
of the market and of the new entrant.
The critical variation that is needed for the econometric analysis concerns new
entry and exit. In order to identify the role of strategic deterrence, it is crucial to
see rms entering in markets that were not previously served by any airline and rms
entering in markets that are already served by other airlines. This variation in the
market structure within markets over time separately identies the e¤ect of strategic
deterrence from the role that sunk costs, operating costs, and demand changes have
on market structure. Table 5 illustrates this type of variation in the data.
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Table 5: Variation in Entry and Exit
One Incumbent No More Than Total
New Entry AA CO DL LCC MA NW UA Incumbent One Incumbent
AA ... 6 6 0 0 8 4 19 73 116
CO 3 ... 11 0 2 1 1 7 43 68
DL 14 16 ... 0 3 3 3 58 57 154
LCC 0 1 4 ... 0 2 0 5 37 49
MA 9 4 16 0 ... 5 3 17 73 127
NW 5 5 11 0 1 ... 4 26 72 124
UA 7 1 9 0 2 9 ... 16 74 118
Total 38 33 57 0 8 28 15 148 429 756
There are 756 new entries over the time period considered. Some patterns are
clear from the table. First, most of these new entries occur where there is more than
one incumbent in the market or where there are no incumbents. Only 20 percent of
the new entries were in markets where there was only one incumbent. Second, low
cost carriers enter disproportionately in markets where there are other incumbents,.
Finally, there that there is less entry by the national airlines where a Low Cost Carrier
is the only incumbent in the market.
5.2 Exclusion Restrictions
We assume that the unobservables are not correlated with our exogenous variables.
We consider a reduced form prot function, where all of the control variables (e.g.
population, distance) are maintained to be exogenous.
The main di¢ culty of estimating Model (1) is given by the presence of the com-
petitorsentry decisions, since it is a simultaneous move entry game. Theorem 2 in
Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] shows that we can identify the parameters with an exclu-
sion restriction consisting of a variable that enters rm is prot but not rm js. If
this variable has wide support (i.e. a large degree of variation), then this reduces the
size of the identied set. We have two variables that work as exclusion restrictions:
Airport Presence and Cost.
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6 Results
We present the results for the empirical specications in the same order as the statisti-
cal models in Section 3. We present the results for the (repeated static) simultaneous,
sequential, and deterrence games. Then we compare the results across the various
specications.
In our results, we report superset condence regions that cover the truth, I , with
a prespecied probability. This parameter might be partially identied. Since, in
general, these models are not point identied, and since the true parameter, along
with all parameters in the identied set minimize a nonlinear objective function, it is
not possible to provide estimates of the bounds on the true parameter. Instead, we
report condence regions that cover the true parameter value and that can be used as
consistent estimators for the bounds of the partially identied parameter I . In each
table we report the cube that contains the condence region that is dened as the set
that contains the parameters that cannot be rejected as the truth with at least 95%
probability.13
Column 1 of Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of a static simulta-
neous move game. Here, the e¤ect of Americans entry is di¤erent from the e¤ect of
Deltas entry on other airlines. However, Americans entry a¤ects all its competitors
in the same way. For example, AA 6= DL. The e¤ect of American on all of its com-
petitors is included in [ 11:589; 9:597], while the e¤ect of Continental is included in
[ 13:816; 11:926]. This implies that the entry of a second competitor is less likely
if Continental enters the market than if American does. The negative e¤ect of the
entry of an LCC on the probability of entry of another competitor is even stronger,
13Not every parameter in the cube belongs to the condence region. This region can contain holes
but here we report the smallest cubethat contains the condence region.
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as it is included in [ 18:954; 16:335]. Overall, LCCS have the strongest negative
e¤ect on competitors, as was also found in Ciliberto and Tamer [2009]. American has
the weakest e¤ect, while the other airlines are comparable ([ 12:436; 10:834] for
Delta, [ 12:681; 11:103] for the MA type, [ 12:910; 11:190] for Northwest, and
[ 12:801; 10:324] for United). In general, the results in Column 1 of Table 6 do
not provide any support for the hypothesis that larger airlines are more aggressive
than low cost airlines. Instead, low cost airlines are the most aggressive in the market,
since it is much less likely that other rms enter when they are present.
Next, market presence, the measure of heterogeneity, has a strong positive sign
and is included in [11:422; 13:233]. The higher the percentage of markets that one
airline serves out of an airport, the more likely it is that a rm enters into a market.
This is consistent with previous work (Berry [1992] and Ciliberto and Tamer [2009]).
The distance from the hub of an airline (our measure of xed costs) is negatively
associated with entry ([ 2:408; 0:868]), which we expected. Both of these results
are robust across the three Columns in Table 6.
The remaining rows of Column 1 in Table 6 present the results for the control
variables. The e¤ect of market distance is included in [0:772; 1:362], which implies that
entry is more likely when the distance between cities is larger. The e¤ect of market
size is included in [1:711; 2:407], which implies that larger markets are more likely to
be served. Markets whose endpoint cities are seeing their incomes increasing are more
likely to be served ([0:646; 1:469]). Markets between cities that have multiple airports
are less likely to be served, ceteris paribus. This does not imply, of course, that cities
with multiple airports are less likely to be served; it just says that airlines are not
likely to serve two markets out of the same city. These four results are robust across
the three specications. Then, there are two results concerning the distance from the
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geographical center of the US and the distance among airports of a city. Neither of
these results is robust to changes in the specications, and it is thus di¢ cult to draw
a clear interpretation.
We calculate the goodness of t by taking the percentage of realized observations
that were correctly predicted by the model. For example, in the simultaneous game,
if the realized observation is one of the multiple equilibria predicted by the model,
that particular observation is counted as correctly predicted. We correctly predict
37% of the outcomes in the simultaneous game.
Table 6: Regression Results
Simult. Move Game Seq. Move Game Deterrence Game
Coe¢ cient Bounds Coe¢ cient Bounds Coe¢ cient Bounds
American, AA [-11.589 -9.597] [-10.880 -7.231] [-13.722 -11.155]
Continental, CO [-13.816 -11.926] [-12.831 -9.111] [-15.870 -13.052]
Delta, DL [-12.436 -10.834] [-11.956 -8.692] [-16.778 -13.984]
LCC, LCC [-18.954 -16.335] [-16.202 -12.464] [-15.590 -12.490]
MA, MA [-12.681 -11.103] [-10.837 -7.610] [-14.263 -11.254]
Northwest, NW [-12.910 -11.190] [-12.687 -9.206] [-12.989 -10.561]
United, UA [-12.801 -10.324] [-11.157 -7.232] [-13.011 -10.618]
Deterrence cost AA, cAA [-7.458 -3.441]
Deterrence cost CO, cCO [-10.430 -8.526]
Deterrence cost DL, cDL [-3.990 -0.258]
Deterrence cost LCC, cLCC [-7.791 -2.679]
Deterrence cost MA, cMA [-9.684 -5.554]
Deterrence cost NW, cNW [-2.576 0.392]
Deterrence cost UA, cUA [-13.535 -9.692]
Market Presence [11.422 13.233] [8.680 9.988] [7.678 10.637]
Min Cost Hub [-2.408 -0.868] [-2.029 -1.344] [-1.102 -0.636]
Market Distance [0.772 1.362] [0.718 1.372] [8.030 9.285]
From Center [-1.304 -0.502] [-0.517 0.055] [1.601 2.873]
Min Distance [-1.513 0.159] [0.608 2.449] [2.636 3.619]
Market Size [1.711 2.407] [1.198 1.683] [2.402 3.320]
Change Income [0.646 1.469] [0.513 1.713] [1.927 3.696]
Number Airports [-1.726 -0.799] [-0.661 0.049] [-5.481 -4.134]
Constant [-1.613 1.544] [-3.318 0.254] [-1.408 3.915]
Function Value 1735.521 1881.632 1724.826
Goodness of Fit 0.37 0.34 0.49
Number Obs 3376 3376 3376
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Column 2 of Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of the game where
rms can play sequentially. Recall that this is the framework where the type of game
that rms play depends on the exogenous history of the game. If there is a single
incumbent, then the rms play a sequential move game. Otherwise, the rms play
a simultaneous move game. The estimation results in Column 2 are quite similar
to those presented in Column 1 of Table 6. The only relevant di¤erence is in the
magnitude of the strategic e¤ects for the larger rms, but the di¤erences are not
statistically signicant as the intervals overlap. Similarly to the simultaneous game,
we calculate the goodness of t by calculating the percentage of realized observa-
tions that are correctly predicted by the sequential game model. Using the estimated
parameters, we predict when incumbents would move rst, thereby restricting the
equilibria to those in which the incumbent serves the market. When the realized
equilibrium is one of our predicted equilibrium, we consider that observation as be-
ing correctly predicted. In the sequential move game, we do slightly worse in our
predictions, though the di¤erence is not signicant.
Column 3 of Table 6 presents the results when rms can make deterrence in-
vestments. This is the rst set of the central results of the paper. The results are
very rich and we go over them in two steps. First, we discuss how the competi-
tive e¤ects, , di¤er in Column 3 from Columns 1 and 2. Then, we discuss the
estimation results for the cost of the deterrence investments, c.
First, we observe that the competitive e¤ects are, in some cases, larger in mag-
nitude in Column 3 than they were in Columns 1 and 2. For example, we nd
that the e¤ect of American on its competitors is now in [ 13:722; 11:155] while
before it was in [ 11:589; 9:597]. Thus, it is larger (in absolute value) and statis-
tically di¤erent. We nd similar results for Continental and Delta. Remarkably, we
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nd the opposite for the low cost carriers, as now their e¤ect on competitors is in
[ 15:590; 12:490] while in Column 1 it was in [ 18:954; 16:335]. The results for
MA, Northwest, and United are similar across the three columns. These are interest-
ing results and indicate that allowing for deterrence investments can lead to di¤erent
estimates of the competitive e¤ects than when we do not allow for rms to deter.
Now, consider the estimates of the costs of deterrence. These costs are crucial
for our analysis, because the higher they are, the less likely it is that a rm deters
new entrants. We nd that American can deter the entry of new rms in its markets
by paying deterrence costs included in [ 7:458; 3:441]. These costs are lower than
the competitive e¤ects of any of Americans rivals (the lowest is Northwest, which is
included in [ 12:989; 10:561]). This implies that American would denitively pay
the deterrence cost if it had the option to do so. The analysis is the same for all
the other rms except for United, whose costs of deterrence overlap the competitive
e¤ects of American, Continental (though by little), LCCs, MA, and Northwest. This
implies that United would only make deterrence investments if facing the potential
competition of Delta. We will return to this nding below.
Overall, these results are striking and indicate that all rms have an incentive to
make deterrence investments, though they face di¤erent costs of doing so.
To determine the t of the model to the data, we estimate the model under the
deterrence parameters and predict when rms would deter entrants. When rms
deter, we predict only one equilibrium (the incumbent remains in the market as a
monopolist). When the incumbent does not deter, the rm still has a rst-mover ad-
vantage and the rms play a sequential game. Under these assumptions, we correctly
predict almost half of the observed outcomes. Since the deterrence game restricts
many market predictions to a single equilibrium (incumbents deter the majority of
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the time) instead of allowing for multiple equilibria as in the simultaneous and se-
quential games, the increased goodness of t provides strong evidence that rms are,
in fact, using deterrence investments.
7 Comparing Prots Across Types of Games
The results in this section compare the prots made in the simultaneous game, the
sequential game and the deterrence game for the incumbent rm only. Because we can
only identify the prots up to a scale, we use the ratios of prots in the di¤erent games
to gauge the economic importance of being a rst mover in the context of sequential-
move and deterrence games. There are two ways we could compute the prots for
comparison purposes. For example, suppose we would like to compare the deterrence
prots to the sequential game prots. One way to do this is to calculate the deterrence
prots under the parameters estimated in the deterrence scenario (Column 3 of
Table 6) and compare these prots to the sequential game prots calculated using
those same deterrence parameters. The second way to compare these two prots is to
compare the deterrence prots under the deterrence scenario to the sequential prots
using the parameters in the sequential-move game (Column 2 of Table 6). In the
rst case, which would be what is done in typical counterfactual analysis, we would
be assuming that the rms actually do play a deterrence game. Instead, we use the
second approach because we are comparing across a menu of games that rms can be
playing. Thus, we compare the prots that we would predict under the estimates in
Columns 1-3 in Table 6. In the remaning analysis we use the parameter values
where the distance function is minimized and simulate 1000 errors and compute the
prots. The ratios of these prots are reported in Tables 8, 9 and 10.
We begin with the simultaneous-move game and we use the parameters in Col-
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Table 7: Entry in Simultaneous Game
% Times in % Times in % Times in
Market in Market in Market in
Best Simult Game Worst Simult Game Rand. Simult Game
AA 0.890 0.038 0.338
CO 0.978 0.055 0.345
DL 0.984 0.106 0.461
LCC 1.000 0.009 0.231
MA 0.849 0.000 0.181
NW 0.936 0.023 0.300
UA 0.805 0.022 0.258
umn 1 of Table 6. We rst check if there is a unique equilibrium because in that
case we have one prot for each rm in the equilibrium. If there are multiple equilib-
ria, then for each incumbent rm we consider three possibilities: i) the highest prot
that the rm makes among all the possible equilibria; ii) the lowest prot, which can
be zero if the rm is not in the unique equilibrium or if the rms is not in at least one
of the multiple equilibria; iii) and the case where the equilibrium is selected randomly,
with equal probabilities across equilibria.
Table 7 shows the percentage of the time each rm enters the market in the
simultaneous game under these three possibilites. Consider Column 1 of Table 7.
For example, the number 0.890 in the rst column and rst row means that American
is present at most 89 percent of the times in either the unique or one of the multiple
equilibria of a game that corresponds to one simulation. The number 0:038 in the
second column and rst row means that American is predicted to be present at least
3.8 percent of the time. Finally, the number 0.338 in the third column and rst row
means that American is present 33:8 percent of the times when we choose among the
multiple equilibria in a random fashion, and includes the cases where American is
present in the unique equilibrium of the game.
For sequential-move equilibria without deterrence investments, equilibrium prots
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Table 8: Ratio of Sequential to Simultaneous Prots
Best Case Worst Case Randomized
Simultaneous Simultaneous Simultaneous
Prots Prots Prots
AA [0.123 0.941] [1.957 14.955] [0.326 2.494]
CO [0.161 0.907] [0.906 5.123] [0.417 2.354]
DL [0.242 0.872] [1.812 6.518] [0.493 1.774]
LCC [0.042 1.128] [7.733 209.447] [0.167 4.529]
MA [0.006 0.547]  [0.029 2.606]
NW [0.123 0.992] [1.105 8.883] [0.365 2.932]
UA [0.074 0.738] [0.792 7.911] [0.233 2.325]
Table 9: Ratio of Deterrence to Sequential Prots
Compared to Max Prot % Times Compared to Min Prot % Times
in Sequential game Firm Deters in Sequential game Firm Deters
AA 1.947 0.920 15.290 0.920
CO 1.344 0.971 7.743 0.971
DL 2.114 0.971 7.618 0.971
LCC 2.059 1.000 55.773 1.000
MA 4.660 1.000 415.605 1.000
NW 2.376 1.000 19.106 1.000
UA 2.202 0.226 17.840 0.700
are calculated using the parameters estimated inColumn 2 of Table 6. As discussed
above the incumbent moves rst but we do not allow for the incumbent to choose
the specic resulting equilibrium. For example, suppose American is the incumbent.
If there are multiple duopoly equilibria, American can choose to be one of the rms
in the market, but it cannot choose its competitor. Therefore, we report bounds on
the sequential prot, where the lower bound is the minimum prot the incumbent
could make in the sequential game and the upper bound is the maximum prot the
incumbent could make in the sequential game. The reported sequential prot is the
average prot for the incumbent rm.
For equilibria in the game with deterrence investments we use the parameter
estimates in Column 3 of Table 6. As before we simulate the games 1000 times
and take the average prot that each rm makes when it chooses to deter.
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Table 10: Ratio of Deterrence to Simultaneous Prots
Best Case Randomized Lower Bound
of Simult Prots of Simult Prots of Simult Prots
AA 1.882 4.990 29.927
CO 1.243 3.225 7.018
DL 1.847 3.756 13.801
LCC 2.322 9.327 431.317
MA 2.547 12.144 
NW 2.357 6.968 21.111
UA 1.318 4.154 14.136
Tables 8 reports the ratio of sequential prots to simultaneous prots. The simul-
taneous equilibrium prot is calculated using three di¤erent methods, as explained
above. The sequential prot is calculated using both the minimum and maximum
sequential prot, which provides bounds on the ratio of the sequential to simultane-
ous prots. The rst column in Table 8 reports the ratio of sequential prots to
simultaneous prots, where the simultaneous equilibrium is chosen as the best possi-
ble equilibrium for the incumbent rm. In Column 1 we show the ratio of prots in
the sequential game to the highest (best case) prots in the simultaneous game. The
values have a range that falls below 1 for most rms, which implies that rms, on
average, do better when they are able to choose the best possible equilibrium in the
simultaneous game (the best case) compared to when they are playing a sequential
game and have a rst-mover advantage but cannot choose a particular equilibrium.
The second columns in Tables 7 and 8 reect the worst case simultaneous
prots, where each simultaneous equilibrium is chosen as the lowest prot for the
rm. MA is never able to enter the market in the worst case scenario, so the lower
bound of simultaneous prots is zero for this rm. For the low cost rm, the ratio of
sequential to lower-bound simultaneous prots is very high; this is due to the fact that
the low cost rm can enter the market only very rarely in the worst-case scenario.
The third column in Table 8 reports the ratio of sequential prots to simultane-
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ous prots when the simultaneous equilibrium is chosen at random from all possible
equilibria; the corresponding column in Table 7 reports the percentage of times the
incumbent enters in the market in equilibrium. The range of the ratio of prots and
the percentage of entry both fall between the best case and worst case scenarios.
This is because the simultaneous equilibrium is chosen at random. This means that
relative to the best case, each rm will enter less, on average, and make lower prots
in the simultaneous game; relative to the worst case, each rm will enter more, on
average, and make more prots in the simultaneous game.
The three ratios of prots provide bounds on the ratio of prots made in the se-
quential game to those made in the simultaneous game. The randomized simultaneous
prots provide perhaps the most informative ratio in the sense that the randomized
prots reect the average prots a rm would make in the simultaneous game, if
the simultaneous game were played many times. For example, American makes, on
average, somewhere between 0:441 and 2:896 times as much prot when it plays a
sequential game versus a simultaneous game where the simultaneous equilibrium is
truly chosen randomly.
Table 9 reports the ratio of deterrence prots to simultaneous prots, where the
deterrence prot is calculated in two di¤erent ways. A rm either compares the prot
when it deters to its maximum possible prot in the sequential game (columns 1 and
2), or it compares the deterrence prot to its minimum possible prot in the sequential
game (Columns 3 and 4). In the rst column, we compare the deterrence prot to
the maximum sequential prot. In the third column, we compare the deterrence prot
to the minimum sequential prot.
When American decides to deter based on its maximum possible prot in the
sequential game, it makes 1:677 times as much prot in the deterrence game compared
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to its best prot in the sequential game and deters 92:0 percent of the time when it is
an incumbent. The remainder of the time, the rm plays the sequential game. When
comparing its deterrence prot to the minimum possible sequential prot, American
makes, on average, 11:001 times more prot when it chooses to deter. It still enters
the market 92:0 percent of the time. For all rms except United, the decision to
deter does not change when comparing the minimum to maximum sequential prots.
This implies that the prots in the sequential game are generally much lower than
when rms choose to deter. The exception is United. United deters much more when
comparing the deterrence prot to the minimum sequential prot versus the maximum
sequential prot. This could be due to the fact that United faces the highest cost
of deterrence, and so would be more sensitive to the relative benet of deterrence.
It could also be the case that the range of prots United makes in the simultaneous
game is greater than for the other airlines.
Table 10 reports the ratio of deterrence prots to simultaneous prots, where the
simultaneous prots are calculated using the three methods described above. Even
when using the best possible scenario in the simultaneous game, column 1 shows that
rms are, on average, better o¤when playing the deterrence game. This benet grows
when the simultaneous equilibrium is chosen randomly and grows even more when
the simultaneous prot is calculated using the worst possible equilibrium for the rm.
In the simultaneous game, MA face a lower bound of zero prots and are never in the
market.
Overall, the prots that incumbents can make in the sequential game, both with
and without deterrence investments, are larger than those that they can make in the
simultaneous move game. Further, on average it is protable for all rms to deter
new entrants, with the exception of United Airlines.
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8 Conclusions
We use a practical approach of estimation to determine whether rms make invest-
ments to raise barriers to deter new entrants. The objective of the estimation is to
quantify the cost of "deterrence investments" (Bernheim [1984]) and relate them to
the monopoly prots that rms make when they successfully deter new entrants and
the prots that they would make as accommodating oligopolists. We model rms as
playing di¤erent types of games depending on the exogenous history of the game in
each market. We nd that the data are consistent with a model where rms make
deterrence investments. Also, we nd that the prots incumbents can make if they
move rst are larger than those that they can make if the game is played simultane-
ously. This result is stronger, as one would expect, when incumbents can deter new
entrants. Finally, we nd that all rms deter new entrants, with the exception of
United Airlines.
There are several limitations to our work which we leave for future research. First,
and most obviously, we nd that rms make deterrence investments, but we do not
characterize the nature of those investments. This avenue of research is clearly impor-
tant for policy interventions. Second, we consider a repeated static game where the
history of the game in each period is exogenous. However, rms are likely forward-
looking when they make their investment decisions. This avenue of research is im-
portant to exactly quantify the cost of deterrence. However, the benet of deterrence
should be even higher if we allow for its benet to extend over time, because rms
would be able to maintain their position as incumbents longer. Therefore, we can
still think of our estimates as providing a measure for what would be the best case
scenario for airlines that wanted to make the case that they do not deter new entrants.
Since we do nd evidence of strategic deterrence even in a repeated static game, we
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would expect our ndings to be even stronger in a dynamic game.
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